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We analyze three types of supply contracts between a supplier and a retailer when both agree
as follows — if a customer experiences a stockout, then the purchased item can be shipped to
the customer on an expedited basis at no extra cost. This practice is referred to as the fast-ship
option in this paper. In the first contract (Structure A), the supplier specifies a total supply
commitment and allows the retailer to choose its split between the initial order and the amount
left to satisfy fast-ship orders. In the other two contracts (Structures B and C), the supplier agrees
to fully supply the retailer’s initial order but places a restriction on the quantity available for
fast-ship commitment. The difference between the second and third contracts is that in contract
Structure B, the supplier moves first, whereas in contract Structure C, the supplier determines its
commitment after observing the retailer’s order. We characterize the supplier’s and the retailer’s
optimal decisions and preferences. We also discuss how the supplier and the retailer may resolve
their conflict regarding the preferred contract type. Supplementary materials are available for this
article. Go to the publisher’s online edition of IIE Transaction for proofs.
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1. Introduction
Stockout occurs when supply falls short of demand. Stockouts are not uncommon in retail supply
chains (Gruen et al. 2002 report a worldwide average out-of-stock rate of 8.3 percent) and often
result in customer dissatisfaction (Grant and Fernie 2008). In industries such as toys and apparel,
matching supply with demand is especially challenging due to fast-changing customer preferences
and market trends, which lead to high inventory costs, markdowns, and lost sales (Johnson 2001).
The options available to customers when they experience stockouts affect profits of supply chain
partners.
When customers learn that the retail store they are in has stocked out of a desired item,
they may respond in a number of different ways. Some customers may switch brands and buy a
substitute product, others may buy from a different retail store, and some others may postpone
purchase decision or choose an entirely different product (Emmelhainz et al. 1991). Such stockout-
triggered purchasing behaviors may hurt retailers even when some customers purchase substitutes
because stockout events can negatively affect the overall sales of products in the same category due
to lack of selections available to customers (Kalyanam et al. 2007). Retailers’ profit margins in
many industry segments are low (for example, see Datamonitor 2008 for electronics industry profile
and profit margins of key players), which suggests that cost-effective means of capturing sales that
are lost during stockout events would be of interest to retailers.
To reduce loss of sales during stockout periods, retailers may negotiate a flexible supply con-
tract that allows them to either adjust the order size before the start of the selling season or to
place multiple orders during the selling season. The latter includes offering a fast-ship option to
customers, which is the focus of this study. A retailer that offers the fast-ship option arranges to
have out-of-stock items shipped directly from the supplier to customers at no additional cost to
the customers, thereby creating a hybrid between traditional and drop-ship channels. For example,
Best Buy, an electronic products’ retailer, offers an Instant Ship option to in-store customers when
mobile devices they intent to purchase are not available in store. Many apparel retailers, such
as J.Crew and Gap Inc., offer to home-ship items when customers cannot find desired items in
the right sizes on the store shelf, absorbing the shipping cost. Office Depot ships ink and toner
cartridges free to customers if it stocks out of such items.
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The fast-ship option allows the channel to use the retailer-held inventory as the primary source
of supply (traditional approach) and supplier-held backup inventory as the secondary source of
supply (drop-ship approach). The latter is used only when the primary source is exhausted. This
contrasts with the two extremes of traditional and drop-ship channels in which all inventory is kept
either at the retailer location or at the supplier location (Wilson 2000). Drop-ship channels are
commonly encountered in the context of Internet-based retailers (e.g., Zappos, an Internet footwear
store). Similarly, the supplier may also procure additional inventory at a higher cost to replenish
its stock as needed.
In the traditional approach, the retailer bears all of the inventory cost and its stocking decision
determines channel performance. Use of drop-ship approach reduces retailers’ inventory cost. How-
ever, this option does not meet the needs of those customers who prefer to touch and feel the items
before buying and those who do not want to wait. In fact, depending on the product, between 47
to 92 percent of retail sales happen in “brick-and-mortar” stores (Schonfeld 2010). The fast-ship
option, which is the focus of this paper, combines the advantages of both traditional and drop-ship
channels and provides a mechanism by which supply-demand mismatch cost may be apportioned
between the retailer and the supplier. Models presented in this paper show that the fast-ship option
has the potential to improve profits of both the retailers and the suppliers.
In a channel that supports the fast-ship option, both the retailer and the supplier have two
opportunities to replenish. The retailer places an initial order before the start of the selling season
and multiple fast-ship orders that occur later in the selling season. The fast-ship orders are placed,
as needed, after inventory at the retail store runs out. Similarly, the supplier procures (or produces)
a certain quantity of items before the selling season, which can be greater than the retailer’s initial
order size, and may procure additional items after demand realization, if needed.
From the retailer’s perspective, the fast-ship option may be particularly attractive for high-
value items for which the obsolescence cost is high and the additional cost of direct shipping to
customers is relatively small. This is because the fast-ship option can reduce the retailer’s cost of
meeting its demand. A supplier who cooperates with the retailer to support the fast-ship option
may also benefit from this practice because the total sales may be higher. However, because the
retailer may decrease its initial order size and the procurement cost for the fast-ship orders may be
higher, suppliers may wish to limit the fast-ship commitment via the terms of a supply contract.
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In this paper, we compare three possible supply commitment contract structures between a
single supplier (S) and a single retailer (R) that support the fast-ship option for a product with
a short selling season. Within each structure, a particular set of values of the retailer’s and the
supplier’s parameters is referred to as a contract. These three structures are variants of quantity
flexibility provisions that are common in supply contracts. We describe related literature at a later
point in this section.
In the first structure (referred to as Structure A contract), the supplier commits to a maximum
total quantity p ≥ 0. The retailer can then choose any initial order quantity q and place any number
of fast-ship requests so long as the total amount ordered does not exceed p. The second structure,
referred to as Structure B, limits only the supplier’s fast-ship commitment. That is, the supplier
commits to supply no more than z ≥ 0 via the fast-ship option. It also supplies any amount q
ordered by the retailer before the start of the selling season. Both A and B are supplier-driven
structures because the supplier makes its choice first and the retailer orders q after learning either
p or z. The third structure, referred to as Structure C, may be viewed as a retailer-led analog
of Structure B because the supplier chooses its fast-ship commitment γ after receiving R’s initial
order q.
The three contract structures belong to a family of affine supply commitment contracts in which
the supplier’s total commitment is an affine function of the form aq + b, and a and b are contract
parameters. Different values of a and b give rise to different relationships between the initial order
size and the fast-ship supply commitment. Specifically, Structure A contract arises when a = 1
and b = p− q, whereas Structures B and C structures arise when a = 1 and b is either z or γ. The
actual number of items that are fast shipped depends on the parameter values chosen by the two
players in each supply structure.
The setting in our paper is motivated by contractual restrictions, also referred to as vertical
restraints (Rey and Verge 2005). While different types of vertical restraints have been studied in
the literature (Rey and Tirole 1986), we consider variants of quantity fixing contracts, that include
minimum quantity purchases, quantity forcing, as well as quantity rationing contracts. Our focus
is on specific forms of quantity rationing contracts where the supplier imposes restrictions on
the quantity available to the buyer. In particular, the three structures are variants of several
quantity fixing contracts used in practice. For example, the Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity
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(ID/IQ) contracts offered by suppliers to government agencies are similar to Structure A (see
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103926). The ID/IQ contract specifies a maximum total
quantity that would be purchased within a fixed time period. The buyer can place multiple orders
and each order can be of an arbitrary size. However, orders must be placed during the contract
period and the negotiated price applies to the orders whose cumulative quantity is less than the
maximum specified in the contract. Similarly, in a practice similar to Structures B and C, state
government agencies require suppliers of road salt (used for de-icing roads during winter) to agree
to supply more than the amount initially ordered at the negotiated price (e.g., BART 2008). The
supplier caps extra supplies at values that are proportional to the initial order quantity. The
ID/IQ and road salt supply contracts are similar in spirit, though not exactly the same, as the
three structures studied in this paper.
We develop mathematical models that help explain how the supplier and the retailer would
choose values of their parameters within each contract structure when they maximize their individ-
ual profits. Specifically, we establish certain properties of the retailer’s and the supplier’s parameter
optimization problems, which allow us to solve these problems using nonlinear optimization tech-
niques. We then compare the three contracts under optimal parameter choices to determine which
structure is preferred by the supplier and which structure is preferred by the retailer. Within
reasonable ranges of problem parameters, we show that from the supplier’s viewpoint, B is the
most preferred structure and A is the least preferred when both the supplier and the retailer make
individually optimal decisions. This is because the retailer orders less up front under Structure A
contract and fast-ship sales are less profitable for the supplier. As a result, among the two supplier-
led structures, the supplier will not offer Structure A, even though A may provide greater flexibility
to the retailer. Structure B is more profitable than C for the supplier because the supplier receives
a larger initial order in Structure B as compared to C.
From the retailer’s perspective, Structure A is usually preferred, except in cases where the
total promised supply (p) is smaller than the promised supply under other contract structures
(i.e. p is less than either q + z or q + γ). However, because Structure A will not be chosen by
the supplier, we compare only Structures B and C from the retailer’s perspective. We show that
when the retailer faces a choice between Structures B and C, it prefers Structure C because it can
secure a greater supply commitment under Structure C as compared to B. We also test whether
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contract structure preference changes if the supplier (resp. retailer) chooses the wholesale price in
supplier-led (resp. retailer-led) contracts.
Clearly, the two players have different contract structure preferences, which gives rise to the
problem of contract type selection. We present two approaches for resolving such differences. In
the first case, one of the two players is assumed to be the dominant player (hold-out). The behavior
of a hold-out player can be explained as follows. When the retailer is the hold-out, it would only
accept a contract in which its profit is at least as much as its best profit under contract Structure
C. Similarly, when the supplier is the hold-out, it would only accept a contract in which its profit
is at least as much as its best profit under contract Structure B. The profits of the two players in
this case are referred to as hold-out profits.
The second case arises when there is no dominant player and neither player can insist on a
minimum profit threshold equal to its optimal profit under its preferred contract structure. Instead,
the two players are willing to negotiate and each player has a disagreement profit level. For the
retailer, the disagreement profit level is the best profit it would make under contract Structure
B and for the supplier, the disagreement profit level is the profit it would make under contract
Structure C. This is because the retailer (respectively supplier) is guaranteed to strike a contract
if it agrees to Structure B (respectively C).
For the first case, we show that the player who is not the hold-out player can propose a contingent
contract that improves its profit over its hold-out profit while maintaining or improving the hold-
out player’s profit. In the second case with no hold-out player, we prove the existence of negotiated
contracts, which guarantee that each player will make more than its disagreement profit. We do not
dwell on the division of profits because many solutions are possible depending on the negotiating
power of each party. However, we show that under a negotiated contract, it is in each player’s
best interest to maximize total supply chain profit, i.e. the negotiation approach is equivalent to
vertical integration of the two players and contract structure preferences become irrelevant. These
two conflict resolving approaches remain valid when the wholesale price is chosen by the leader in
the contract. Specifically, this means the wholesale price is determined by the supplier in Structure
B and the retailer in Structure C.
We also briefly discuss the effect of partial backorder rate. Specifically, we observe that a higher
partial backorder rate is beneficial for the supplier in Structure B and for the retailer in Structure
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C. For other cases, the results depend on parameters. However, it is more likely that both players
can benefit from higher partial backorder rate in Structure C.
Related Literature
Supply contracts are widely used in industry (e.g., White et al. 2005) and commitment flexibility,
similar to that implied by the three contract structures we study, is a common theme in supply
contracts’ literature; see, for example, Van Mieghem (2003), Wu et al. (2005), and Stevenson and
Spring (2007). Quantity flexibility (QF) allows the buyer to adjust the purchase quantity in a
certain range without penalty, reducing the channel’s cost of matching supply and demand (Wu
2005).
In a QF contract, the buyer announces an early tentative order qT before the production period
begins. Knowing qT , the supplier commits to supply qS. After receiving a more accurate demand
forecast, which occurs before the selling season starts, the buyer then adjusts its order size and comes
up with a final (firm) order qF . The buyer (respectively supplier) is not penalized if qF ≥ qT − a
(respectively qS ≥ min{qF , (qT + b)}), where a and b are called flexibility parameters (see, e.g.,
Tsay 1999). That is, the buyer in a QF contract commits to purchasing no less than a certain
amount/percent below the forecast and the seller commits to supply up to a certain amount/percent
above the forecast.
The supply commitment contracts we study serve a different purpose than QF contracts. The
fast-ship option is triggered only after stockout occurs and its purpose is to provide a mechanism for
serving unmet demand. In contrast, the reason for allowing quantity adjustments in QF contracts
is to reduce the expected cost of overage and shortage. QF contracts do not help retailers meet
demand that occurs after stockouts. Another difference is that fast-ship sales induce additional
costs for both the supplier and the retailer in our supply commitment contracts, whereas, in QF
contracts, quantity adjustments within permissible ranges do not induce additional costs. Finally,
supply flexibility parameters are often exogenously determined in QF contracts; for example, a ≥ 0
and b ≥ −a are exogenous in Tsay (1999). In our setting, within each contract structure, the supply
commitment is determined by parameters p, z, or γ, which are chosen by the supplier, and both
players pick individually optimal contract parameters.
Structure A contract is also related to Eppen and Iyer’s (1997a) two-period stochastic dynamic
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programming model of a backup agreement contract. In the first period, the buyer commits to
buy up to some amount qT for the selling season and claims immediate ownership of (1 − σ)qT
units where σ is exogenous. After period-1 demand is realized, the buyer can adjust its inventory
by placing a second order of up to σqT units at the original price in period 2. In each period, a
small portion of sales is returned and a constant fraction of returned units can be reused to satisfy
demand. In addition, the buyer pays a penalty ℓ for any reserved units that are not purchased.
Our approach is similar because we also allow the retailer to place a second order up to some
pre-determined total quantity commitment by the supplier. However, our problem is different
because (1) the total supply commitment is a decision made by the supplier in our models and
consequently the buyer does not pay a penalty for not purchasing all of the promised supply, (2) we
model both the supplier’s and the retailer’s problems and obtain their optimal parameters, whereas
Eppen and Iyer do not address the supplier’s problem, and (3) Eppen and Iyer focus on the impact
of backup fraction σ and penalty ℓ on the buyer’s expected profit and commitment qT , whereas we
study the interactions between the supplier and the retailer for three different contract structures
when both players make individually-optimal decisions within each structure.
Our model is also related to previous works involving more than one replenishment opportu-
nity; see, for example, Eppen and Iyer (1997b), Gurnani and Tang (1999), and Donohue (2000).
These authors have studied the use of two ordering opportunities for fashion products when both
opportunities arise prior to the start of the selling season. The retailer, after placing an initial
order, observes a signal that is correlated with the demand during the selling period. With this
new information, the demand forecast is updated and the second replenishment is used to lower
supply-demand mismatch costs. The focus of the papers cited above is to model the effect of the
retailer getting additional (but incomplete) demand information after placing its first order. In
contrast, in our setting, the purpose of the second replenishment (which takes place after demand
realization) is to serve customers that agree to wait for out-of-stock items (see Gupta et al. 2010
for similar settings).
The dual strategy model in Netessine and Rudi (2006) is also related to our model. When
dual strategy is adopted, each retailer uses its stockpile as the primary source of items needed to
satisfy demand and drop shipping as a backup source when its stock runs out. However, there are
important differences between our work and Netessine and Rudi (2006). First, Netessine and Rudi
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(2006) assumes that when in-store inventory runs out, all remaining customers agree to receive their
items from the drop-ship channel, which corresponds to setting α = 1 in our model. Our model is
more general and can be applied to situations in which some customers do not take advantage of the
fast-ship option. Second, the supplier in our model has two replenishment opportunities whereas
the supplier in Netessine and Rudi (2006) has a single replenishment opportunity. Put differently,
the scenario discussed in Netessine and Rudi is a special case in our model. Netessine and Rudi
(2006) compares the dual strategy with both pure traditional (i.e. where z or γ = 0) and pure
drop-ship (i.e. where q = 0) environments. In contrast, we analyze different contract structures
within which the fast-ship commitment level is chosen by the supplier. Netessine and Rudi (2006)
paper identifies the best channel strategy as a function of supply chain parameters whereas we
provide insights into supply chain partners’ contract structure preferences and parameter choices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Notation and model formulations for the three
contract structures are introduced in Section 2. We analyze the two player’s optimal decisions for
Structures A and B in Section 3, and Structure C in Section 4. In Section 5, we contrast the three
structures from the retailer’s and the supplier’s perspectives and address the problem of contract
structure selection. Section 6 discusses the effect of leader-selected wholesale price and the effect
of different values of partial backorder rate. Summary of main results, and directions for future
research are provided in Section 7. All proofs are presented in an Online Supplement within the
publisher’s online edition of IIE Transaction.
2. Notation and Model Formulation
The sequence of events for the three contract structures are illustrated in Figure 1. The retailer
offers the fast-ship option until the available fast-ship commitment (as guaranteed via its contract
with the supplier) is exhausted. Structures A and B are supplier-led contracts and commitments
p and z are decided before the retailer decides the order quantity. Structure C is a retailer-led
contract in which commitment γ is decided after the retailer’s order quantity decision.
The notation used in model formation is listed in Table 1. R’s demand X ∈ R+ is continuous
with probability density and distribution functions f(·) and F (·), respectively. We also assume
that f(·) > 0 over the support of X. Note that only a fraction of customers utilize the fast-ship
option (referred as the partial backorder rate in this paper), and the rest do not make a purchase
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Supplier chooses p Retailer chooses q Up to p− q fast-ship orders are supported
Supplier chooses z Retailer chooses q Up to z fast-ship orders are supported





Figure 1: The Sequence of Events for the Contract Structures A, B and C
at the retailer’s store. This is similar to partial backorders where the retailer backorders only when
a customer is willing to wait (see, for example, Abad 1996). The supplier procures q + y items
before the selling season, and may procure additional items during the selling season as needed.
The supplier’s replenishment costs are c1 and c2 for the two replenishment options. The supplier
pays a holding cost h for the additional y units it procures because these items are sold only at the
end of the selling period. The supplier replenishes during the selling season only when y cannot
satisfy all promised fast-ship orders.
The shipping costs for regular and fast-ship orders are τ1 and τ2, respectively. Both τ1 and
τ2 are paid by the supplier to a third party logistics service provider. Note that τ1 and τ2 are
independent of origin and destination because shipping charges depend on the item’s size and/or
weight but not origin and destination. Such pricing schemes are common in the US; see for example
U.S. Postal Service’s (www.usps.com) shipping rates for standard-sized boxes of certain maximum
weight regardless of origin and destination. The retailer sells items to customers at a unit retail
price r regardless of whether the item is sold from on-hand inventory or by using the fast-ship
option. The supplier sells items to the retailer at a unit wholesale price w for initial orders, and
w + δ for fast-ship orders; that is, the wholesale price for fast-ship items is obtained by adding
a mark-up δ ≥ 0 to the base price w and markups of 15-20% are common (Scheel 1990). For
notational simplification, we also use w2 = w + δ to denote the wholesale price of fast-ship items.
Parameters r, w, and δ are are assumed exogenous in this paper. Scenarios with endogenous w
are discussed in Section 6. In addition, we make the following assumptions about key parameters.
Assumption 1. τ1 ≤ τ2.
Assumption 2. c1 ≤ c2.
Assumption 3. c1 + h ≤ c2.
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Table 1: Summary of Notation
Notation Description
Decision Variables:
p S’s total commitment under Structure A, p ≥ 0
z S’s fast-ship commitment under Structure B, z ≥ 0
γ S’s fast-ship commitment under Structure C, γ ≥ 0
y S’s extra production quantity
q R’s order quantity, q ≥ 0
Parameters:
X Demand with density and distribution functions f(·) > 0 and F (·)
α Partial Backorder Rate, α ∈ [0, 1]
y Additional units procured during the first replenishment, y ≥ 0
w Wholesale price per unit for regular orders, w ≥ c1 + τ1
δ Markup per unit for fast-ship orders, δ ≥ 0
w2 Wholesale price per unit for the fast-ship orders, w2 = w + δ
τ1, τ2 Regular/fast-ship order shipping cost per unit, τ1, τ2 ≥ 0
c1, c2 S’s first/second replenishment costs per unit, c1, c2 ≥ 0
h Holding cost incurred by S for stocking each extra unit, h ≥ 0
r Retail price per unit, r ≥ 0
Assumption 1 reflects the fact that fast-ship orders utilize premium shipping (more expensive)
with expedited delivery, whereas regular orders are sent to retailers utilizing an economical trans-
portation system. Assumption 2 implies that the second batch procurement cost is higher than the
first because suppliers have shorter time windows within which to obtain the second replenishment.
Conditional upon needing an item to satisfy excess demand, Assumption 3 makes it cheaper for
the supplier to procure this item in the first batch and hold it till the end of the selling season.
Although our model remains valid without Assumption 3, it serves to make h relevant because
otherwise the supplier would not stock extra units and no holding cost would be incurred.
We also assume that parameters are chosen such that the fast-ship option is attractive to both
the supplier and the retailer, which is assured by the following two assumptions:
Assumption 4. w < r − δ.
Assumption 5. w − τ1 − c1 ≥ α(w2 − τ2 − c1 − h) ≥ 0.
Assumption 4 ensures that both initial and fast-ship orders are profitable for the retailer. In
absence of this requirement, the retailer may choose not to offer the fast-ship option to customers
when a stockout occurs. Because w2 ≥ w (i.e., δ ≥ 0) and the retail price does not change when
items are supplied via the fast-ship option, the retailer’s unit profit is greater if an item is supplied
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from stock. Assumption 5 is a sufficient condition under which the fast-ship orders are also less
profitable for the supplier. If this condition were violated, the supplier might not supply orders
before the start of the selling season and offer an infinite fast-ship commitment under all three
contract structures, which would obviate the need to study different contract structures. That is,
Assumption 5 identifies a range of problem parameters within which the questions posed in this
paper are non-trivial. We explain the logic behind Assumption 5 in the ensuing paragraph.
The supplier’s contribution margin from a sale from the first replenishment is (w−τ1−c1) and at
most α(w2−τ2−c1−h) from the second replenishment. This is because only α fraction of customers
would purchase the item when experiencing stockout. Therefore, if w−τ1−c1 ≥ α(w2−τ2−c1−h) ≥
0, then the supplier definitely earns more from each unit ordered by the retailer in its initial order.
Two scenarios arise when Assumption 5 is violated. If w − τ1 − c1 < α(w2 − τ2 − c2), then we can
show that the three structures are identical and the supplier would choose p, z, and γ = ∞ because
fast-ship order produces higher profits. However, if α(w2−τ2−c2) < w−τ1−c1 ≤ α(w2−τ2−c1−h),
then we are not able to obtain results analytically because the marginal benefits for both types of
orders depend on other parameters. Numerically, we observe that there exists a threshold between
α(w2 − τ2 − c2) and α(w2 − τ2 − c1 − h) such that our results hold if (w − τ1 − c1) is greater than
the threshold. Later in Sections 3 and 4, we show that w2 ≥ τ2 + c2 is sufficient for p
∗ = γ∗ = ∞
within Structures A and C, but that z∗ is not necessarily unbounded under the same condition.
Because the expedited transportation cost is linear in the number of fast-ship items, modeling
several fast-ship orders as a single second replenishment does not affect the profit functions of the
two players. In other words, the total fast-ship demand can be represented as α(x − q)+, where
b+ = max(0, b). Let index i ∈ {A,B,C} denote contract structure. In expressions that apply to all
contract structures, we use parameter j ∈ {p, z, γ} to denote supply commitment. The retailer’s
expected profit given that contract structure i has been selected, supplier has committed j, and
retailer has ordered q, can be written as follows.
πiR(q, j) = rE[X ∧ q]− wq + (r − w2)E[α(X − q)
+ ∧ ζ ij(q)], (1)
where (X ∧ q) denotes min(X, q), and ζ ij(q) is the maximum fast-ship supply committed by S.
That is, ζ ij(q) = p − q, or z, or γ when (i, j) = (A, p), (B, z), and (C, γ), respectively. Moreover,
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rE[X ∧ q]−wq is the expected profit from the initial order, (α(X− q)+∧ ζ ij(q)) is the magnitude of
fast-ship demand and (r−w2)E[α(X − q)
+∧ ζ ij(q)] is the expected profit from the fast-ship orders.
Equation (1) assumes that both players have made their decisions. The optimal values of decision
variables depend on the sequence in which the two players make their decisions, but the resulting
profit for the retailer after decisions are made can be expressed as (1) for all contract types.
Similarly, given that contract structure i has been selected, the retailer has ordered q, and the
supplier has chosen y and j, the supplier’s expected profit is given by
πiS(y, j, q) = (w − τ1 − c1)q − (c1 + h)y + (w2 − τ2)E[α(X − q)
+ ∧ ζ ij(q)]
−c2E[(α(X − q)
+ − y)+ ∧ (ζ ij(q)− y)
+]. (2)
In (2), (w − τ1 − c1)q is the profit from R’s initial order, (c1 + h)y is the cost of procuring and
stocking extra y items, and (w2 − τ2)E[α(X − q)
+ ∧ ζ ij(q)] is the revenue from fast-ship demand.
The last term comes from the fact that S has an uncovered commitment of (ζ ij(q) − y)
+ and
the leftover fast-ship demand after stockpile y is exhausted equals (α(X − q)+ − y)+. Therefore,
c2E[(α(X − q)
+ − y)+ ∧ (ζ ij(q) − y)
+] is the extra procurement cost for the fast-ship orders that
are not served from the amount stocked by the supplier in response to the retailer’s initial order.
Similar to Equation (1), Equation (2) also assumes that both players have made their decisions.
Although the optimal values of either player’s decision variables depend on the sequence of events,
the resulting profit of the supplier can be expressed as (2) for all contract types.
In Structures A and B, the supplier is the first mover. Therefore, when (i, j) ∈ {(A, p), (B, z)},
the retailer’s problem is to find qi(j) = argmax πiR(q, j) for each supplier-selected j whereas the
supplier’s problem is to find yi(j) = argmaxπiS(y, j, q




In contrast, the retailer is the first mover in Structure C. Therefore, the supplier’s problem in
Structure C is to find yC(q) = argmaxy π
C
S (y, γ, q) and γ(q) = argmaxγ π
C
S (y
C(q), γ, q) for each
retailer-selected q whereas the retailer’s problem is to find qC = argmaxq π
C
R(q, γ(q)).
With expressions (1) and (2) in hand, we are ready to find optimal parameter values for each
player under each contract structure. In the ensuing analysis, we use eij(q)
.
= q + ζ ij(q)/α for
notational convenience and assume, without loss of generality, that both the retailer and the supplier
pick the smallest among possible optimal parameter values when multiple such values exist. Because
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in Structures A and B, the supplier moves first and in Structure C the retailer moves first, we present
the analysis of Structures A and B in the same section (i.e., Section 3). The analysis of Structure
C is presented separately in Section 4.
3. Parameter Optimization: Structures A and B
In the main body of the paper, we describe our key results and explain why the results hold. An
optimal order quantity for the retailer qi(j) = argmax πiR(q, j), (i, j) ∈ {(A, p), (B, z)} can be
obtained as follows.
Proposition 1. For (i, j) ∈ {(A, p), (B, z)}, πiR(q, j) is concave in q and R’s optimal order quan-



























r − α(r − w2)
)
. (4)
The second part of Equation (3) and Equation (4) are obtained from the first order optimality
conditions. The first part of Equation (3) can be explained as follows. When p is small, the retailer
prefers to have all item sold from the initial stockpile, i.e., qA(p) = p. This is because the retailer
expects to sell most of the available supply and the marginal benefit of satisfying a demand from
the initial stockpile is higher than or equal to that of satisfying demand by taking advantage of
the fast-ship option (because w ≤ w2). Define q
A(p)′
.
= ∂qA(p)/∂p and qB(z)′
.
= ∂qB(z)/∂z. Using
(3)-(4), we obtain two inequalities in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The following inequalities hold:
1. 0 ≤ qA(p)′ ≤ (1− α)−1.
2. −α−1 ≤ qB(z)′ ≤ 0.
Lemma 1 shows that the retailer orders more (reps. less) under Structure A (reps. B) when
the supplier’s commitment increases. The inequalities qA(p)′ ≤ (1 − α)−1 and −α−1 ≤ qB(z)′
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themselves do not have meaningful explanations but are required to establish parameter choices
and structural preferences in this paper.
Let πiR(j) = maxq
πiR(q, j) denote R’s optimal expected profit as a function of j when i ∈ {A,B}.
From (1), we observe that πiR(q, j) is increasing in j if we were to keep q fixed because r−w2 ≥ 0.
Hence, πiR(j) = π
i
R(q
i(j), j) must be increasing in j as well. This makes sense on an intuitive level.
A higher value of j implies greater supply flexibility for the retailer. As a result, it incurs a smaller
cost of coping with demand uncertainty because the retailer is able to satisfy more demand after
inventory runs out.
The supplier’s expected profit πiS(y, j, q
i(j)) shown in (2) is concave in y. Therefore, we obtain
an optimal yi(j) = argmaxπiS(y, j, q
i(j)) as follows.
yi(j) = [α(ηS − q
i(j))+ ∧ ζ ij(q
i(j))], (5)
where ηS = F̄
−1((c1 + h)/c2) and F̄
−1(x) = 0 if x ≥ 1. The quantity ηS has a straightforward
explanation. If the supplier stocks out (relative to its commitment), then it incurs a unit shortage
cost of (c2 − c1 − h). If, in contrast, it stocks too much, then its overage cost is (c1 + h). Thus,
F̄ (ηS) = (c1 + h)/(c1 + h+ c2 − c1 − h) represents the fractile of demand that the supplier should
stock in absence of constraints. However, its commitment is limited to ζ ij(q
i(j)), only α fraction of
customers use fast-ship option, and y is needed only after the retailer’s initial stockpile qi(j) runs
out. This explains expression (5).
Let pL = F̄
−1(w/w2). Also, define p1 = min{p : p − q
A(p) = α(ηS − q
A(p))}, z1 = min{z :
z = α(ηS − q
B(z))}, p2 = min{p : q
A(p) = ηS}, and z2 = min{z : q
B(z) = ηS}, . Note that p2
(respectively z2) exists only if lim
p→∞
qA(p) ≥ ηS (respectively lim
z→∞
qB(z) ≤ ηS ≤ lim
z→0
qB(z)). Lemma
2 below explains how the value of yi(j) changes in p or z.
Lemma 2. The following statements are true:
1. (a) Inequality p−qA(p) < α(ηS−q
A(p)) holds if and only if p < p1. (b) Inequality ηS−q
A(p) >
0 holds if and only if p2 exists and p < p2.
2. (a) If lim
p→∞
qA(p) ≥ ηS and pL ≤ p2, then pL ≤ p1 ≤ p2. (b) If lim
p→∞
qA(p) ≥ ηS and pL > p2,
then yA(p) = 0 for all p.(c) If lim
p→∞
qA(p) < ηS, then pL ≤ p1.
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3. (a) Inequality z < α(ηS − q
B(z)) holds if and only if z < z1. (b) Inequality ηS − q
B(z) < 0
holds if and only if z2 exists and z < z2.
4. (a) If lim
z→∞
qB(z) > ηS, then y
B(z) = 0 for all z. (b) If lim
z→0
qB(z) < ηS, then y
B(z) = z for
z < z1 and y
B(z) = α(ηS − q
B(z)) for z ≥ z1. (c) If lim
z→∞
qB(z) ≤ ηS ≤ lim
z→0
qB(z), then
yB(z) = 0 for z < z2 and y
B(z) = α(ηS − q
B(z)) for z ≥ z2.
The results in Lemma 2 are important because they help obtain Proposition 3 shown later in
this section. We summarize the values of yij for different values of p and z in Table 2. For ease of
presentation, A1, A2, · · · B3 are used to denote different ranges of parameter values in Table 2.
Note that when p < pL, y
A(p) = p − qA(p) = 0 because the fast-ship option is not offered by the
supplier.
Table 2: Values of yA(p) and yB(z)
(a) Structure A
Scenario Conditions Range of p Value of yA(p)
A1 lim
p→∞
qA(p) ≥ ηS and p2 ≤ pL
p ∈ [0, pL) y
A(p) = p− qA(p) = 0




qA(p) ≥ ηS and p2 > pL
p ∈ [0, pL) y
A(p) = p− qA(p) = 0
p ∈ [pL, p1) y
A(p) = p− qA(p)
p ∈ [p1, p2) y
A(p) = α(ηS − q
A(p))





p ∈ [0, pL) y
A(p) = p− qA(p) = 0
p ∈ [pL, p1) y
A(p) = p− qA(p)
p ∈ [p1,∞) y
A(p) = α(ηS − q
A(p))
(b) Structure B
Scenario Conditions Range of z Value of yB(z)
B1 lim
z→∞





z ∈ [0, z2) y
B(z) = z
z ∈ [z1,∞) y




qB(z) ≤ ηS ≤ lim
z→0
qB(z)) z ∈ [0, zθ) y
B(z) = 0
z ∈ [z2,∞) y





i(j), j, qi(j)). This implies that j∗ = argmaxj π
i
S(j) for each (i, j) ∈ {(A, p),
(B, z)}. We are now ready to solve for j∗. Let qi(j)′ denote the rate of change in q as a function of
j. We first point out a sufficient condition in Proposition 2 in which the supplier does not restrict
its total commitment under contract Structure A. This happens when w2 ≥ c2 + τ2.
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Proposition 2. If w2 ≥ c2 + τ2, then p
∗ is unbounded.
When w2 ≥ c2 + τ2, the supplier can earn a positive profit from fast-ship orders even if it does
not produce any extra quantity up front (i.e. y = 0). As a result, there is no economic reason for
the supplier to limit the size of its commitment. One may be tempted to extend this intuition
to contract Structure B. That is, to expect that when w2 ≥ c2 + τ2, the supplier always chooses
z∗ = ∞. As we show below, the above result may not always hold for Structure B.
Next, we prove that the supplier’s profit under Structures A and B is unimodal in p and z for
exponential and uniform demand distributions. A profit maximizing value of p can be unbounded as
seen in Proposition 2, but the optimal value of z is always finite. In addition to these distributions,
we studied Gaussian and Gamma distributions numerically (the latter with shape parameter ≥ 1)
and found that the result in Proposition 3 held in all our numerical experiments. In the sequel, we
shall assume that the supplier’s profit under Structures A and B is unimodal. Note that the results
presented in the rest of this paper do not depend on a particular demand distribution so long as
unimodality of supplier’s profit function holds.
Proposition 3. If the demand is either exponentially or uniformly distributed, then the following
two statements are true:
1. the supplier’s profit under a Structure A contract has at most one local maximum. The global
maximizer p∗ is either equal to the local maximizer, or p∗ is unbounded.
2. the supplier’s profit under a Structure B contract has at most one local maximum. The global
maximizer z∗ is either equal to the local maximizer, or z∗ = 0, or z∗ is unbounded.
Proposition 3 implies that the optimal p (respectively z) can be obtained efficiently via simple
line searches and by comparing the supplier’s profit at the local maximizer with that at p = ∞
(respectively z = 0 or ∞). Note that when w2 ≥ c2 + τ2, the supplier can earn additional profit
by satisfying fast-ship demand beyond its commitment specified in contract terms. However, the
retailer would then anticipate greater availability and lower its initial order, which would lower the
supplier’s profit. Hence, the supplier has an incentive to uphold contract terms and supply no more
than its commitment.
Before closing this section, we present a comparison of Structures A and B in terms of their
impact on retailer’s stocking decision. Recall that 0 ≤ qA(p)′ ≤ (1− α)−1 and −α−1 ≤ qB(z)′ ≤ 0,
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which shows that R responds differently within the two structures if the supplier were to increase
available supply — q is non-decreasing in p and non-increasing in z. The different responses
come from different ways in which the retailer can react to changes in supply commitments under
Structures A and B. These observations also provide greater insights into the relative size of initial
orders, see Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4. For any p and z, qA(p) ≤ qB(z).
Proposition 4 shows that independent of contract parameter values within each structure, the
supplier receives a larger initial order under Structure B as compared to A. This result is used to
establish the preference of the supplier for Structure B over A in Proposition 8.
4. Parameter Optimization: Structure C
In Structure C, the supplier chooses γ after knowing q. Recall that the extra supply y is chosen by
the supplier after observing q in all three structures. Because πCS (y, γ, q) is concave in y (proof is
omitted for brevity), it can be shown that the supplier chooses yC according to
yC(q) = [α(ηS − q)
+ ∧ γ]. (6)
Let ηR = F̄
−1((c1 + h)/(w2 − τ2)). We obtain γ(q) = argmaxγ π
C
S (y
C(q), γ, q) in Proposition 5
below.
Proposition 5. The supplier’s profit πCS (y
C(q), γ, q) is either unbounded or unimodal in γ. In











The quantity ηR can be explained in a manner similar to ηS . The reason that c2 does not appear
in the expression for ηR is that when w2 < c2 + τ2, the supplier always selects y = γ and there is
no need to obtain more items at unit cost c2.
Next, we obtain an optimal order quantity, qC = argmaxq π
C
R(q, γ(q)), as shown in Proposition
6 below. Hereafter, we use πCR(q) = π
C
R(q, γ(q)) and π
C
S (q) = π
C
S (y
C(q), γ(q), q) for convenience.
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Proposition 6. The retailer’s profit is bimodal in q and there exists a ĉ1 ∈ [w(w2 − τ2)/r-h,
w(w2 − τ2)/(r−α(r−w2))−h] such that the optimal order quantity q


















if w2 < c2 + τ2 and c1 > ĉ1.
(8)
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is as follows. When either the wholesale price is sufficiently
large (w2 ≥ c2 + τ2), or the unit cost of supplier’s initial purchase is sufficiently small (w2 < c2 + τ2
and c1 ≤ ĉ1), the supplier makes an ample fast-ship commitment to the retailer. In such cases, the
retailer’s decision is based upon an assumption of ample availability of fast-ship supply. That is,
the vast majority of customers who exercise the fast-ship option are served in this case. However,
when w2 < c2 + τ2 and c1 > ĉ1, the supplier chooses a conservative value of γ(q) because its second
replenishment cost is higher. Anticipating this response, the retailer orders more up front.
Note that when qC = F̄−1 (w/r) and γ(qC) = 0, a Structure C contract is identical to a
Structure B contract with z∗ = 0. Similarly, when w2 ≥ c2 + τ2, Structures A and C are identical
because qA = qC and p − qA = γ(qC) = ∞. That is, in some cases, the ability to be the first to
choose contract parameters (also called market leadership) does not affect either party’s expected
profit. Equation (7) and Proposition 6 also help obtain the following inequalities.
Proposition 7. For a fixed pair of (w, δ) values, the following inequalities hold: (1) qA(p) ≤ qC
for any p, (2) γ(q̂) ≥ z∗ where q̂ = qB(z∗), and (3) qB(ẑ) ≥ qC where ẑ = γ(qC).
The arguments that lead to Part 1 of Proposition 7 are similar to those presented immediately
after Proposition 4. Because the retailer enjoys greater freedom to adjust the supply between initial
order and fast-ship orders under contract Structure A, it is not required to commit to an order
quantity as large as that in contract Structure C. The intuition behind Part 2 of Proposition 7 is
that because the supplier chooses γ after knowing qC , it can commit to a higher supply than that
under Structure B without worrying about the possibility that a higher supply commitment may
induce the retailer to order less up front. For similar reasons, the retailer chooses a smaller order
quantity under Structure C when the fast-ship supply commitment under Structure C is the same
as that under Structure B (Part 3 of Proposition 7). Proposition 7 is important because it leads to
key results related to contract structure preferences (Proposition 8) and the possibility of resolving
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conflict (Proposition 9) in Section 5.
5. Contract Structure Preference and Selection
We first investigate which contract structures are preferred by each player. In Proposition 8, we
show that the supplier weakly prefers Structure B contracts and the retailer weakly prefers Structure
A contracts unless the total promised supply under Structure A is lower than that under the other
two contract types. In Proposition 8, the relationship “<” denotes a weak preference.
Proposition 8. For a fixed pair of (w, δ) values, the following statements are true.
1. The supplier’s preference ordering of contract structures is B < C < A.
2. If the total promised supply under Structure A is at least as much as that under Structures B
and C, then the retailer prefers A.
3. When Structure A is unavailable, the retailer prefers C < B.
Proposition 8 can be explained by first observing that for the same total supply commitment,
the supplier’s profit is higher within a contract structure that induces the retailer to order more up
front. This is because higher initial purchase quantity simultaneously increases initial sales revenue
and reduces the need for fast-ship supply, which can be costly to the supplier. Conversely, the
retailer’s profit is higher when a contract structure allows it to order slightly less up front without
sacrificing supply commitment, or else when a structure allows it to obtain a greater fast-ship supply
commitment for the same initial purchase quantity. From Proposition 3 and Part 1 of Proposition
7, we observe that the retailer orders less when Structure A is utilized, regardless of supplier’s total
commitment. Therefore, it is clear that Structure A is the least preferred structure for the supplier.
Moreover, from Part 3 of Proposition 7, we observe that when supply commitment is held the same,
the retailer orders more under Structure B than Structure C. This explains the preference ordering
of contract structures from the supplier’s viewpoint. Within supplier-led structures, B < A even
when w is chosen by the supplier within the constraint that w ≤ r − δ for each fixed δ.
We consider the retailer’s viewpoint next. If the total supply under Structure A is no less than
that under the other two structures, it is clear that this would be the preferred structure for the
retailer because the retailer can choose to order less up front. In other words, although the retailer
is the first mover in Structure C, Structure A provides greater flexibility as long as the supply is
sufficient. We also proved in Proposition 8 that the retailer prefers Structure C over B because the
retailer can secure greater supply commitment for the same initial purchase quantity. Therefore R
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prefers Structure C to B even when it has the right to choose wholesale price (see details in Section
6).
5.1 Contract Structure Selection
We observed above that between the two supplier-led structures, the supplier prefers B over A.
Therefore, a supplier will not select A so long as the option to select B is available. We also
observed that among Structures B and C, the supplier prefers B, whereas the retailer prefers C.
This creates a potential conflict. In this section, we discuss how such conflict may be resolved.
We present two approaches for resolving conflict in contract selection preferences. The contract
resolution approach depends on whether one player is dominant over the other. First, we show
that when there is a dominant (hold-out) player, the other player can offer a modified contract to
increase its profit without hurting the hold-out player’s profit. Second, we show that when there is
no hold-out player, that is, both players have equal power, they can use a bargaining framework to
decide the split of profit between themselves such that both players’ profits are higher than their
disagreement profits.
Scenarios with a Hold-Out Player
If the channel has a hold-out player, then this means that the hold-out player will cooperate only
if its profit equals its maximum profit under its preferred contract structure. However, this may
lead to a lower profit for the other player. We argue next that as a non-hold-out player, either the
supplier or the retailer may offer a modified contract that improves its profit and simultaneously
make the other player weakly prefer the modified contract. We show below that such recourse
is always available. In this Proposition, z∗ (respectively qC) is the optimal choice of supplier’s
(respectively retailer’s) decision variable under contract Structure B (respectively C).
Proposition 9.
1. There exists a z ≥ z∗ such that πBR (z) ≥ π
C
R(q




2. There exists a q ≥ qC such that πBR(z
∗) ≤ πCR(q) and π
B
S (z
∗) ≤ πCS (q).
The results in Proposition 9 can be explained as follows. If the retailer is the hold-out player and
it strictly prefers Structure C contract, then the supplier may offer a higher supply commitment
only if the retailer agrees to the choice of Structure B and ensure that the retailer earns a slightly
higher profit under modified B than that under C. In addition, the order quantity under the
modified Structure B contract (accepted by the retailer) can be proven to be higher than that
under Structure C contract (arguments are similar to those underlying Part 3 of Proposition 7).
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Therefore, the modified Structure B contract is still a better choice for the supplier. Similarly, if
the supplier is the hold-out player, the retailer can find a q ≥ qC such that the modified Structure
C contract is preferred by both the supplier and the retailer. This happens because the supply
commitment under modified Structure C contract remains higher than z∗ (arguments are similar
to Part 2 of Proposition 7).
Next, we use an example to illustrate the results shown in Proposition 9. Consider a case in
which X is Gamma distributed with E[X] = 400 and V ar(X) = 8000. Other problem parameters
are r = 12, w = 8, w2 = 10.5, τ1 = 0.1, τ2 = 2, c1 = 1, c2 = 9, h = 0, and α = 0.5. The results are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Examples of Conflict Resolution by Providing Modified Contracts
(a) The Supplier is the Hold-Out Player and The Retailer Offers Modified Contract C







Individual Optimum 70.5 348.5 81.0 346.0 2610.7 1265.8 2601.0 1267.8
R’s Counter Offer – – 79.52 349.0 – – 2614.4 1267.6
(b) The Retailer is the Hold-Out Player and The Supplier Offers Modified Contract B







Individual Optimum 70.5 348.5 81.0 346.0 2610.7 1265.8 2601.0 1267.8
S’s Counter Offer 85 347.6 – – 2608.0 1268.6 – –
The first rows of Tables 3(a) and 3(b) show both parties’ profits and preferences when each
makes individually optimal decision. That is, z∗ = 70.5 and qC = 346. As shown in Proposition
8, the supplier prefers B and the retailer prefers C. In the second row of Table 3(a), we present a
modified Structure C contract when the retailer commits to a higher-than-optimal order quantity.
We see that when the retailer increases qC from 346 to 349, both parties prefer the modified C
contract over B. In this example, the retailer’s profit increases from 1265.8 to 1267.6 and the
supplier’s profit increases from 2610.7 to 2614.4. The retailer’s profit is only slightly less than its
best profit of 1267.8, which would be realized under Structure C.
Similarly, if the supplier offers a modified B contract by increasing z from 70.5 to 85, results
are shown in Table 3(b). In this example, both players prefer the modified B contract as compared
to the original C contract. The retailer’s profit increases from 1267.8 to 1268.6 and the supplier’s
profit increases from 2601.0 to 2608.0. Note that the modified contracts B and C also generate
greater channel profits compared to original contracts.
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Scenarios Without a Hold-Out Player
Suppose there is no hold-out player. In this case, each player has a minimum profit expectation,
referred to as the disagreement profit. We define disagreement profits next. Because the supplier’s
profit is greater under contract Structure B and the retailer’s profit is greater under Structure C,
the disagreement profits (minimum profit each party expects to earn) are πBR (z
∗) and πCS (q
C) for
the retailer and the supplier, respectively. We call these disagreement profits because the retailer
(respectively the supplier) can always earn a minimum of πBR (z
∗) (respectively πCS (q
c)) by agreeing
to the selection of contract Structure B (respectively C).
Let πiT (q, y, j) denote the total supply chain profit in a negotiated profit allocation scheme
when both players agree to use contract structure i ∈ {B,C} and 0 < σS < 1 (respectively σR =
1 − σS) denote the supplier’s (respectively retailer’s) fraction of total profits, i.e., π
i
S,T (q, y, j) =
σSπ
i
T (q, y, j) and π
i
R,T (q, y, j) = σRπ
i
T (q, y, j). Because σS and σR do not depend on (q, y, j),




πiR,T (q, ŷ, ĵ) = σR argmax
q
πiT (q, ŷ, ĵ), (9)
and
(ŷi, ĵi) = argmax
(y,j)
πiS,T (q̂, y, j) = σS argmax
(y,j)
πiT (q̂i, y, j). (10)
By the definition of (q̂, ŷ, ĵ), we obtain πiT (q̂, ŷ, ĵ) ≥ π
i
T (q, y, j) for any (q, y, j). Furthermore, the
only difference between Structures B and C is the sequence of decisions. That is, πBT (q, y, z) =
πCT (q, y, γ) if z = γ. Because the decision sequence does not matter when the two players agree
to maximize total profits in the supply chain, it follows that q̂B = q̂C and ẑ = γ̂. In other words,
when the two player decide to negotiate a profit sharing contract, Structure B and Structure C
are identical and there is no contract preference issue. The only question that remains is whether
a negotiated contract yields higher profit as compared to each player’s disagreement profit. This
question is answered in the following proposition.
Proposition 10. There exists some (σR, σS) such that π
i
S,T (q̂, ŷ, ĵ) ≥ π
C
S (q
C) and πiR,T (q̂, ŷ, ĵ) ≥
πBR (z
∗).
Proposition 10 shows that the two players can always find a set of (σR, σS) such that a negotiated
contract generates a higher individual profit than each player’s disagreement profit. That is, a
conflict can be resolved as long as σ lies between σR and σS .
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Contract satisfying Proposition 10 can result either from direct negotiation between the retailer
and the supplier or when the two players trust this decision to a third party arbiter. If the arbiter
were to choose a profit allocation that lies outside the feasible range we identified (e.g., σ < σR or
σ > σS), then negotiated solution would not exist because in that case one of the two players would
do better by accepting the holdout position of the other player in the first place. That is if one of
the parties knows that it will not receive a fair share in a negotiated solution, then negotiation will
not occur because this party can do better by accepting the holdout position of the other party.
We demonstrate how such negotiation might work through an example. Using parameters
introduced in Table 3(a) and 3(b), we observe that πiT (q̂, ŷ, ĵ) = 4218.7. Hence, any negotiated
contract with σS ∈ [0.62, 0.7] should be acceptable to the two players when there is no hold-out
player. In particular, when σS = 0.65, the supplier earns 2742.2, which is greater than 2601.0
(profit under C). Similarly, the retailer earns 1476.5, which is greater than 1265.8 (profit under B).
Note that the contract conflict still exists when w is chosen by the contract leader. In such
scenarios, the two approaches for resolving conflict also remain valid. We discuss those scenarios
in Section 6.
6. Insights
6.1 Contract Structure Preferences and Selection with Endogenous w
In this section, we allow w to be chosen by the first mover in a contract. That is, w and z are
simultaneously selected by the supplier in Structure B. Similarly, w and q in Structure C are
selected by the retailer before the supplier decides γ. The purpose of these variants is to study if
the structural results obtained when w was assumed exogenous remain intact. We do not consider
cases in which δ is chosen by the supplier because it can be argued that the supplier would then
set δ = r − w. The retailer would make zero profit from fast-ship orders and all contracts would
become heavily skewed in favor of the supplier.
Contract Structure Preferences
When w is exogenous, we showed that Structure A will not be chosen by the supplier. We can argue
that the same result holds when w is chosen by the supplier. Hence, we only focus on Structures
B and C in this section. Recall that the supplier prefers Structure B over C for a fixed w (see
Proposition 8). Hence, the same ordering holds with endogenous w because the supplier’s profit
for Structure B is even higher when w for Structure B is also selected by the supplier. Similarly,
the retailer prefers Structure C over B when it chooses w within Structure C. In other words, the
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conflict between the supplier’s and the retailer’s preference identified in Proposition 8 still exists
when the wholesale price is endogenous and the leader is endowed with pricing power.
Contract Selection With a Hold-Out Player
Using the same parameters that we used for the for example presented in Table 3, we demonstrate
how the two conflict resolving approaches shown in Section 5.1 work when w is endogenous. In
Table 4, we show that when there is a hold-out player, a counter offer from the non-hold-out player
can make both players weakly prefer the modified contract to the hold-out contract. This means
that the approach we obtained in Proposition 9 remains intact for endogenous w as well. However,
if the retailer is the hold-out and the wholesale price is endogenous, the supplier’s profit may be 0
in some cases. This is because the retailer may choose w = c1 + τ1 in Structure C. In such cases, a
counter offer from the supplier does not improve either player’s profit. This is illustrated in Table
4(b). When the retailer is the hold-out, we observe that the supplier’s profit remains 0 and the
retailer earns the entire supply chain profit of 4166.6 with or without a counter offer.
Table 4: Examples of Conflict Resolution by Providing Modified Contracts
(a) The Supplier is the Hold-Out Player and The Retailer Offers Modified Contract C







Original 9.5 786.4 325.7 1.1 0 523.3 3062.5 712.5 0 4166.6
R’s Offer – – – 9.5 754.2 333.5 – – 3065.1 714.4
(b) The Retailer is the Hold-Out Player and The Supplier Offers Modified Contract B







Original 9.5 786.4 325.7 1.1 0 523.3 3062.5 712.5 0 4166.6
S’s Offer 1.1 0 523.3 – – – 0 4166.6 – –
Contract Selection Without a Hold-Out Player
When there is no hold-out player and the wholesale price is endogenous, we can always find a
negotiated contract (with a profit allocation decided either by both players or by the third-party
arbiter) that is acceptable to the two players, which is similar to results shown in Proposition 10.
Using the same parameters used for the example with exogenous wholesale price, πiT (q̂, ŷ, ĵ) =
4218.7 and both players earn more than their disagreement profits (e.g., 0 for the supplier and
712.5 for the retailer) when σS is in between [0, 0.83].
In summary, we observe that having endogenous w does not change the preferences of the
supplier and the retailer. It also does not affect the two conflict resolving mechanisms. However,
because the profit difference in the two structures is greater when w is endogenous, the benefit from
the two conflict resolving approaches might be small.
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6.2 The Effect of Partial Backorder Rate
In this section, we briefly discuss the effect of partial backorder rate which is largely based on a
series of numerical examples involving Structures B and C. At the outset, we expect the retailer
to benefit from a higher value of α (because both over- and under-stocking costs can be reduced
when a greater fraction of customers are willing to exercise the fast-ship option), but we do not
necessarily expect the supplier to realize a greater profit (because its cost increases with greater
reliance on fast-ship supplies). Our analysis shows that this preliminary intuition is not entirely
correct. We observe that the supplier always earns a greater profit in Structure B whereas the
retailer earns a greater profit in Structure C when the value of α is high. Other than these two
cases, the two players’ profit changes in α depend on problem parameters. We begin with analytical
results of this section.
Proposition 11. The retailer’s profit for Structure C is non-decreasing in partial backorder rate
regardless of whether w is exogenous or endogenous.
The results behind Proposition 11 can be explained as follows. Because the supplier always
chooses a greater commitment under a higher α for any fixed q and w, the retailer earns more
profit from the fast-ship orders. Hence, when the order quantity q (and the endogenous wholesale
price w) are chosen optimally by the retailer, the retailer’s profit is even higher under higher α.
Note that the retailer’s profit is not affect by α if γ(q) = 0.
We can also show that the supplier earns more profit under Structure C for a higher α when w
is set equal to c1 + τ1 by the retailer. This is because when w
∗ = c1 + τ1, the supplier earns zero
profit for the initial order. Therefore, the fast-ship order becomes the only profitable source for the
supplier in such cases and its profit increases as α increases provided γ(q) 6= 0 (that is, when the
supplier chooses to support the fast-ship option).
Other than the two scenarios discussed above, the effect of partial backorder rate on the re-
tailer’s and the supplier’s profits can only be obtained numerically. We briefly summarize the
results in Table 5, which vary with problem parameters. In general, we observe that the supplier
(reps. retailer) earns more profit under higher partial backorder rate within Structure B (reps. C)
because it has the advantage of being the leader. However, the follower in a contract usually earns
less profit from higher partial backorder rate unless the procurement cost is low.
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Table 5: The Effect of Partial Backorder Rate α
Exogenous w Endogenous w
Structure B Structure C Structure B Structure C
c1 Supplier Retailer Supplier Retailer Supplier Retailer Supplier Retailer
Low ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ /− ↑ ↓ /− ↑ /− ↑ /−
High ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ /− ↑ ↓ /− ↑ / ↓ /− ↑ /−
↑: increasing in α; ↓: increasing in α; −: invariant in α
7. Concluding Remarks
In decentralized supply chains, retailers make stocking decisions to meet uncertain demand. How-
ever, retailers often experience stockouts leading to costly opportunity loss. To address this issue,
some retailers may offer a fast-ship option (i.e. directly ship out-of-stock items) to customers. Of-
fering such an option can be beneficial to both the supplier and the retailer because the total sales
may increase. However, the incentives for the two players may be different since the provision of
fast ship reduces (respectively increases) inventory cost for the retailer (respectively the supplier).
In this paper, we studied three different contract structures to provide insights into the effect
of different contract types and parameters values on each player’s and channel’s performance.
The main contribution of this paper lies in presenting a mathematically rigorous framework for
comparing different contract structures. We proved that Structure A is dominated by B from the
supplier’s perspective. Therefore, we argued that the supplier will not offer Structure A contracts
even though they are preferred by the retailer. Among the remaining two structures, we showed
that the supplier prefers Structure B whereas the retailer prefers Structure C. We presented two
different approaches for resolving differences in contract structure preferences. In the first case,
the holdout players contract preference does not prevail because the non-holdout player can make
a better counteroffer. In case the two players negotiate in good faith, channel optimality could be
reached so long as the profits are shared in a reasonable manner. We establish the existence of
range of profit shares that result in such a solution.
This paper presents an initial attempt to address a gap in the literature on models dealing
with the fast-ship option. While the fast-ship option is used by some retailers, there is not much
academic literature that focuses on different contract structures within this context. In practice,
fast-ship option can be implemented in several different ways. Getting direct supply from the
original supplier may not be the only option. In fact, supply sources for fast-ship orders include
both primary and secondary suppliers, where the latter often specialize in fast delivery of small
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orders. Also, fast-ship orders may be filled by retailers who agree to pool excess inventory.
Many avenues of future research remain open. One such direction is to study the supplier-
retailer interactions when two or more retailers form an alliance to cover each other’s shortage.
Another direction would be to investigate how the availability of fast-ship option affects a retailer’s
ordering policy in a multi-period setting. Both these topics are currently under investigation by
the authors.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Dr. Maqbool Dada (departmental editor), the associate editor, and two
anonymous referees for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.
References
Abad, P. L. (1996). Optimal pricing and lot-sizing under conditions of perishability and partial
backordering. Management Science, 42(8), 1093–1104.
BART (2008). Analysis of Ohio’s road salt market and 2008-2009 price increase. Technical report,
The Ohio Department of Transportation.
Datamonitor (2008). Global computer and electronics retail: Industry profile. Technical report.
Donohue, K. L. (2000). Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two
production modes. Management Science, 46(11), 1397–1411.
Emmelhainz, M. A., Stock, J. R., and Emmelhainz, L. W. (1991). Guest commentary: Consumer
responses to retail stock-outs. Journal of Retailing, 14(2), 138 –147.
Eppen, G. D. and Iyer, A. V. (1997a). Backup agreements in fashion buying – the value of upstream
flexibility. Management Science, 43(11), 1469–1484.
Eppen, G. D. and Iyer, A. V. (1997b). Improved fashion buying with bayesian updates. Operations
Research, 45(6), 805–819.
Grant, D. B. and Fernie, J. (2008). Research note: Exploring out-of-stock and on-shelf availability in
non-grocery, high street retailing. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management,
36(8), 661–672.
Gruen, T. W., Corsten, D. S., and Bharadwaj, S. (2002). Retail out of stocks: A worldwide
27
examination of extent, causes, and consumer responses. Technical report, A publication of
The Grocery Manufacturers of America, Washington, DC.
Gupta, D., Gurnani, H., and Chen, H. W. (2010). When do retailers benefit from special ordering?
International Journal of Inventory Research, 1(2), 150–173.
Gurnani, H. and Tang, C. S. (1999). Optimal ordering decisions with uncertain cost and demand
forecast updating. Management Science, 45(10), 1456–1462.
Johnson, E. M. (2001). Learning from toys: Lessons in managing supply chain risk from the toy
industry. California Management Review, 43(3), 106–124.
Kalyanam, K., Borle, S., and Boatwright, P. (2007). Deconstructing each item’s category contri-
bution. Marketing Science, 26(3), 327 – 341.
Netessine, S. and Rudi, N. (2006). Supply chain choice on the internet. Management Science,
52(6), 844–864.
Rey, P. and Tirole, J. (1986). The logic of vertical restraints. The American Economic Review,
76(5), 921–939.
Rey, P. and Verge, T. (2005). The economics of vertical restraints. Working Paper.
Scheel, N. T. (1990). Drop Shipping as a Marketing Function: A Handbook of Methods and Policies.
Greenwood Publishing Group, West Port, CT.
Schonfeld, E. (2010). US Web retail sales to reach $249 billion by ’14. REUTERS, March, 8, 2010.
Stevenson, M. and Spring, M. (2007). Flexibility from a supply chain perspective: definition and
review. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 27(7), 685–713.
Tsay, A. A. (1999). The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives. Management
Science, 45(10), 1339–1358.
Van Mieghem, J. A. (2003). Commissioned paper: Capacity management, investment, and hedging:
Review and recent developments. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 5(4),
269–302.
White, A., Daniel, E. M., and Mohdzain, M. (2005). The role of emergent information technologies
and systems in enabling supply chain agility. International Journal of Information Manage-
ment, 25, 396–410.
28
Wilson, R. F. (2000). Distribution decisions: Drop-shipping vs. inventory vs. fulfillment house.
Web Marketing Today, June 1, 2000.
Wu, J. (2005). Quantity flexibility contracts under bayesian updating. Computers & Operations
Research, 32(5), 1267–1288.
Wu, S. D., Erkoc, M., and Karabuk, S. (2005). Managing capacity in the high-tech industry: A
review of literature. The Engineering Economist, 50, 125–158.
29
